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The labor supply incentives provided by the early retirement rules of the United States Social
Security Old Age benets program are of growing importance as the Normal Retirement Age
(NRA) increases to 67, and the labor force participation of Older Americans starts to increase.
These incentives allow individuals who claim benets before the NRA but continue to work,
or return to the labor force, to increase their future rate of benet pay by having benets
withheld. Since the adjustment of the benet rate takes place only after the NRA is reached,
benets received before the NRAcan become actuarially unfair for those who continue to work
after claiming. Consistent with these incentives, estimates, using a bivariate hazard model
of the monthly exit and claiming hazard using data from the Health and Retirement Study
indicate that early claimers who continue to work are likely to exit the labor force later than
non-claimers. Moreover, early claimers who re-enter the labor force are likely to have longer
employment spells than non-claimers who return to the labor force.
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sis, Health and Retirement Study
JEL classication: J26, H55, C41
 We aregratefultoanumberofemployeesoftheSocialSecurityAdministrationwhohavepatientlyansweredour
questions. These employees include attendants in the Toll-Free number of the SSA, a number of claim representatives
in the Field Ofce in Patchogue (Suffolk County, New York), and also a number of researchers of the SSA who have
claried many issues. Among the latter, Barbara Lingg, Christine Vance, and Joyce Manchester have been especially
generous with their time. We are thankful to Stan Panis for his help using the aML software. We are also thankful,
for their comments and suggestions, to the participants of the Conference on Improving Social Insurance Programs
at the University of Maryland, the participants of the Applied Micro Seminar at the University of Maryland, the
participants at SOLE 2004, and the participants of the Conference on Labor Market Policy Evaluation in Seville. We
also thank Gary Fournier, Dave Macpherson, Huan Ni, John Rust, and Caroline Austin for their useful comments and
suggestions. Ben´ tez-Silva is grateful for the nancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology
through project number BEC2002-04294-C02-01and to the Fundaci´ on BBVA. Any remaining errors are our own.
 Ben´ tez-Silva: Economics Department, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, N.Y.
11794-4384,phone: (631) 632-7551, fax: (631) 632-7516, e-mail: hugo.benitez-silva@sunysb.edu1 Introduction
As of October of 2005, 70.2% of men and 75.3% of women in the U.S. claimed Social Security
benets before the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) compared to 36% and 59% in 1970, respec-
tively.1 The U.S. Social Security system provides fairly complex incentives that can affect the
labor supply behavior of workers between the early and NRA. Some of the most important incen-
tives are the Earnings Test, which determines the maximum level of earnings that do not result
in a benet reduction for individuals who have claimed retirement benets before the NRA, and
the Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF), which determines the permanent reduction in benets that
individuals face if they claim benets early. However, these incentives are also some of the most
widely misunderstood features of Social Security. This is due in part to the relatively little research
on labor supply and claiming behavior of early retirees, and the absence of any formal analysis of
the possibility of affecting the Actuarial Reduction Factor by working after claiming benets. This
research is an attempt to ll this gap by jointly modeling labor supply and claiming decisions in a
duration analysis framework, at a time when these incentives, which affect all Americans reaching
retirement age, will be in place for a longer and longer period as the NRA increases to 67 in the
next few years, and maybe further as a way of reforming the Social Security system to assure its
future sustainability.
Individuals who claim benets before the NRA but continue to work or re-enter the labor
force after a leisure spell can reduce the early retirement penalty by suspending benet payments.2
1 The early retirement age is 62. The NRA will increase from the current 65 and six months to 67 for cohorts
born in 1941 to 1960 and thereafter. The shift towards early claiming of benets has happened in many countries as
described for example in Gruber and Wise (2004)
2 Inthispaperwearenotconsideringspousalbenetsandjointdecisionmakinginthehousehold. Thecomplexities
introduced by those considerations are out of the scope of this analysis. See Votruba (2003) for a discussion. By
ignoring spousal benets we are not taking into account the fact that approximately 5.96% of the individuals who
receive some type of Old Age, Survivors, or Disability Insurance (OASDI) benets receive them as spouses of an
entitled retiree. This percentage comes from the Public-Use Microdata File provided by the SSA and refers to a 1%
random sample of all beneciaries as of December of 2001.
1The early retirement reduction factor, in turn, will be increased proportionally to the number of
months without benets, which will increase benets permanently after the individual reaches
the NRA. Any benets received before the NRA are subject to the (unadjusted) reduction factor
that corresponds to the respondent's age when benets were initially claimed. The adjustment
mechanism of the Actuarial Reduction Factor allows those who become beneciaries before the
NRA to partially or completely reverse the nancial consequences of their decision, averting being
locked-in at the reduced rate.3
To illustrate these incentives we present the following example: Think of two otherwise identi-
cal individuals who turn 62 on July 1st of a given year, and earn $30,000 of labor income between
July of that year and the following June. They had the same earnings history and hence the same
implied Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of $11,550.4 One of them claims benets in the month
she turns 62 while the other waits until her 63rd birthday to claim benets. Suppose rst that
both decide to withdraw from the labor force at the time when they claim benets. In this case,
the early claimer receives yearly benets of $9,240 between age 62 and her death while the later
claimer receives benets of $10,010 between age 63 and her death. Clearly, in this scenario the
person who claims later receives a higher benet stream at any reasonable discount rate, assuming
average longevity. Alternatively, if the early claimer decides to continue to work, earns above the
earnings limit, and withdraws from the labor force at her 63rd birthday, then she receives no bene-
ts between 62 and 63, annual benets of $9,240 between age 63 and 65, and $10,010 thereafter.
In this case the benets received after 65 are the same for the early and the later claimer since the
3 Myers (1993, p. 52), Gruber and Orszag (1999 and 2000), and Ben´ tez-Silva and Heiland (2005) discuss this
mechanism in some detail.
4 The PIA is calculated as a concave piece-wise linear function of the worker's average earnings subject to Social
Security taxes taken over her highest 35 years of earnings. The assumed PIA is the product of a given history of
earnings. With this PIA someone who claims at age 62 would be entitled to a benet amount of $9,240 a year,
assuming a NRA of 65. If that person has a labor income of $30,000 in the year after turning 62, all her benets
would be withheld. This calculation uses an Earnings Test Limit of $11,520a year and assumes that the $30,000labor
income does not affect the PIA.
2benet rate of early claimers after the NRA is adjusted to reect the actual benet pick-up before
the NRA.
This example illustrates two important aspects of the incentives provided by OASDI. Firstly,
once benets are claimed (here 62nd vs. 63rd birthday), the person who claims earlier faces a
stronger incentive to participate in the labor force and earn above the earnings limit than the later
claimer. This is true since earning above the Earnings Test is the only way for the earlier claimer
to possibly reduce the retirement penalty associated with having claimed before the NRA. As
shown by the example, the person who claimed at 62 can reduce the early retirement penalty by
continuing to work and earn above the earnings limit, but cannot avoid that benets received at
any time before the NRA reect the retirement reduction factor as of the time of claim initiation,
since the adjustment of that rate does not apply until the NRA is reached. The latter point has not
been made in previous research but is key to understanding that the early retirement penalty is only
actuarially fair for individuals who either claim and receive benets continuously thereafter (no
adjustment of the reduction factor) or claim and have all benet withheld due to the Earnings Test
(full adjustment of the reduction factor), i.e. work continuously after claiming until the NRA. The
rate of benet pay of a person who claimed benets before the NRA, and who has some benets
withheld, is not adjusted upwards until the NRA and hence becomes increasingly actuarially unfair
as the number of month between benet initiation and receipt increases. Secondly, if we observe
individuals claiming early and continuing to work and earning above the earnings limit, it has to
be that claiming early has an intrinsic value to them. We elaborate on these points in Section 3.4.,
when discussing our identication strategy.
There are numerous reasons for claiming benets before the NRA while continuing to work or
expecting a return to work, because having claimed benets provides a type of insurance. First,
individuals who face uncertain job prospects or uncertain income streams in general may le for
3Social Security benets as soon as they are eligible to secure benet payments if needed. Process-
ing the initial Social Security claim takes up to three months. Reinstating the monthly payments
takes around six weeks. Also, in most states unemployment benets are not deducted from Social
Security benets and vice-versa, i.e. unemployment benets and Social Security benets can be
received at the same time.5 Second, with the ongoing debate about reforming the Social Security
system, individualseligible for early retirement benets may become claimers even though they do
not plan to withdraw from the labor force. Their motivation is to insure that they cannot be made
worse off by changes to Social Security. Finally, beneciaries may nd themselves in a situation
where they would like to trade off their reduced benets for increases in their future rate of benet
pay (e.g. as new job opportunities come along).
In order for the Social Security Administration to suspend benets an individual has to earn
enough above the Earnings Test Limit such that the implied taxes completely offset at least one
month of benets.6 Consequently an increase in the Earnings Test Limit makes it more difcult for
these individuals to affect their future benet rate. Even if the benet reduction were actuarially
fair for individuals with low earnings potential, they may be made worse off by a higher Earnings
Test Limit since it eliminates the option to affect the rate of future benet pay for them. In this
sense increases in the Earnings Test Limit can be regressive. This effect may be offset, however,
if individuals with lower incomes also expect to have a shorter life, and therefore benet from a
higher Earnings Test Limit. In this case the Earnings Test itself can be seen as regressive since
lower income individuals who see their benets withheld may be taxed more than high income
earners from a lifetime perspective (e.g., Gruber and Orszag 1999).
5 Hutchens (1999), accounting for demand side effects, shows that early retirement benets can be a form of
unemployment insurance that can lead to inefciently high levels of early retirement.
6 During the rst year after claiming benets the Social Security Administration performs a monthly test to deter-
mine whether the person should receive the monthly benet check. After the rst year the test is yearly and it depends
on the expected earnings of the individual.
4To what extent older Americans know about some of these relatively subtle incentives has been
debated. Most previous studies have argued that individuals respond to the taxation incentives
provided by the Earnings Test but do not take the adjustment of the rate of future benets into
account.7 Some anecdotal evidence we have gathered indicates that future retirees can have a hard
time nding the appropriate information to make truly informed decisions regarding the effects of
work after claiming benets.8 However, these incentives have been in place in this form for more
than two decades and the specics of benet withholding due to the Earnings Test and subsequent
adjustment of the reduction factor are documented in the Social Security Handbook (SSA-H) and
the internal operating manual used by Social Security eld employees when processing benet
claims (SSA-M). In addition, several employees from the Social Security Administration, includ-
ing claim representatives at a local SSA, ofce conrm that these rules are implemented by the
government when calculating retirement benets.
While the details of the effect of the reduction factor on labor supply behavior and earnings
have been documented, their role in initiatingthe receipts of benets early, continuingemployment
after reaching the early retirement age, and the level of earnings has not been formally investigated.
Most existing early retirement research has focused on individuals who claim benets and with-
draw from the labor force at the same time. However, benet receipt data from SSA indicate that
7 Reimers and Honig (1993 and 1996) interpret their ndings that current Social Security benets not Social Secu-
rity wealth predict labor force reentry behavior as evidence that individuals do not take the subsequent replacement of
withheld benets into account. However, their analysis does not consider the possibility that individuals seek to affect
the reduction factor by continuing to work. Friedberg (1998 and 2000) studies the effect of changes in the Earnings
Test rule prior to 2000 on labor supply and nds that up to 5 percent of individuals bunch just below the Earnings Test
limit and appear to adjust with the Earnings Test Limit, suggesting that these individuals may perceive benets that
are withheld as lost. Ben´ tez-Silva and Heiland (2005) estimate that no more than 30% of older Americans may know
about these incentives.
8 For example, the benets calculator provided by the Social Security Administration (www.ssa.gov) does not
have any reference to the mechanism that allows individuals to affect their Actuarial Reduction Factor by earning
above the Earnings Test after claiming and receiving benets. In recent months SSA has been updating a number
of its publications regarding the role of work after claiming benets. In the package of information that individuals
receive once they claim benets it is now included a considerably clearer statement about the consequenceof working
while claiming benets. These statements do not only focus on the taxation aspects, but describe in simple terms the
adjustment mechanism. These are SSA Publication No. 05-10077, and SSA Publication No. 05-10069.
5an estimated 8.5% of all individuals who claim benets before the NRA in 2001 had some benets
withheld because of their earnings (SSA 2002, p. 256).9 This suggests that there is a sizable group
of individuals who have claimed benets and either worked continuously or re-entered the labor
market.
Descriptive evidence from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) also supports the impor-
tance of the group of individuals who claim benets before they withdraw from the labor market.
Figure 1 plots the month-claiming and labor force exit behavior of the individuals in our sample.
Points along the diagonal represent individuals who claimed and exited the labor force around the
same time whereas points to the right of the diagonal represent those who exited the labor force
later than the month they claimed benets.10 This latter group which contains more than 200 in-
dividuals is the one we are most interested in. Although the behavior associated with this group,
continuation of work after claiming, is not as common as claiming and exiting at the same time or
claiming after exiting (1,730 cases), this group is still substantial, and a majority of these individ-
uals claimed within three months of turning 62, but continued working up to 30 months after. This
is evidence of the potential importance of the mechanisms we describe and analyze in this paper.
Our hypothesis is that the possibility to reverse part or all of the (lifetime) penalty associated
with claiming benets early, and the fact that the reduced rate associated with early retirement
is not adjusted before the NRA for those who claim early and have some benets withheld, has
important consequences for early retirement behavior and labor supply between age 62 and the
9 The SSA provides estimates based on a 1% random sample of all beneciaries as of December of 2001 from
the Master Beneciary Record. An estimated 100,000 of all individuals who claimed benets early in 2001 saw
their benets withheld, and therefore had their actuarial reduction factor affected by their labor supply decisions after
claiming benets.
10 Notice that this is not a density plot, therefore each dot can represent multiple individuals. However, the density
plots (not shown) did not add much information to what Figure 1 already shows. Points in the boundaries ('-1', '0',
'39', '40') represent censored observations, which account for individuals that are either right censored ('40') or do
not claim by age 65 ('39'), do not exit the labor force by age 65 ('39'), or were not working on their 62nd birthday
and not working ('0') or with missing work data ('-1') the month before turning 62, depending on the quadrant in the
gure.
6NRA. While the majority of early claimers withdraw from the labor force at the time of claiming,
or before, to enter retirement, a group of early claimers who continue to work exists. This group
shouldceteris paribushave a longer employment spell before exiting the labor force than their
counterparts who claim benets later. The reason is that those who claim earlier face a low benet
rate if they withdraw from the labor force at that time. Early claimers have a greater incentive than
later claimers to continue to work and earn above the earnings limit to increase the benet rate ef-
fective when they retire after reaching their NRA. Moreover, by the same logic, early claimers who
initially withdrew from the labor force but decide to return should also have longer employment
spells than later claimers in the same situation.
We present estimates of exit and claiming continuous time proportional hazard models both
in a single equation setting and a simultaneous equations framework, using data from the HRS to
investigate the role of the time of initiation of Social Security benets in labor force participation
behavior of Americans between ages 62 and 65. While our results conrm that early claimers
are more likely to exit the labor market than those who have not claimed yet, we also nd an
exit pattern among claimers who is consistent with the trade-offs provided by the early retirement
incentives. The model predicts that an individual who claimed early benets in a particular month
is about 21.1% less likely to exit the labor market in the following month than an individual who
had not claimed benets at that time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature
overview, Section 3 describes the incentives provided by the ARF and the Earnings Test for in-
dividuals' labor supply decisions and earnings, and the empirical strategy to identify the role of the
option to adjust the ARF on exit from and re-entry to the labor force. Section 4 describes the data,
and the econometric models we estimate. Section 5 presents the empirical results, including results
from exit and re-entry hazard models, and a simultaneous model of labor force exit and claiming
7behavior. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Overview of the Literature
The general retirementliteratureisvast.11 Itsmainobjectivehas been totrytounderstandthe effect
of Social Security on labor supplyand wealth accumulation, but it has paid relativelylittleattention
to the implications of work after claiming benets between the early and normal retirement age.
In particular the implications of affecting future benets by working more and earning above the
earnings limits, for retirement behavior before the normal retirement age have not been carefully
investigatedyet. These incentivesare becomingan increasinglymoreimportantaspectof the social
insurance system in the United States as the period between the early and normal retirement age
widens. This study provides one of the rst empirical investigations of the behavioral implications
of these incentives.
Within the literature on early retirement and labor supply one line of research has focused on
the taxation aspects of the Earnings Test (Vroman 1985, Burtless and Moftt 1985, Honig and
Reimers 1989, Leonesio 1990, Reimers and Honig 1993, Reimers and Honig 1996, Friedberg
1998, Baker and Benjamin 1999, Friedberg 2000, and Votruba 2003), but has paid little attention
to the potential impact that having the option to affect the reduction factor even after claiming
benets early (i.e. before NRA) may have on retirement behavior. Other related literature has
approached the issue by estimating structural models of retirement (Rust and Phelan 1997; French
2005; Gustman and Steinmeier 2002; van der Klaauw and Wolpin 2005, to name some of the
most recent research efforts), but in that work there is little discussion of the mechanism we are
emphasizing, and it is unclear to what extent the ndings from that literature reect this particular
11 For a recent survey of this broad retirement literature see Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999). Hurd (1990), Lums-
daine (1995), and Ruhm (1996) provide good discussions of the earlier literature.
8set of incentives provided by Social Security.
Reimers and Honig (1993 and 1996) do analyze the trade-offs of claiming early versus late in
the context of re-entry into the labor market. However, the possibility that individuals can affect
the reduction factor by continuing to work is ignored. Friedberg (1998 and 2000) studies the effect
of changes in the Earnings Test rule prior to 2000 on labor supply and nds that up to 5 percent
of individuals bunch just below the Earnings Test limit and appear to adjust with the Earnings Test
Limit. This suggests that there are individuals who consider benets withheld due to the Earnings
Test as a loss, either due to misinformation or differences that make the adjustment actuarially
unfair for them (e.g., lower life expectancy). However, this does not rule out that a second group
of individuals exists that is aware that benets withheld before the NRA increase the rate of future
benet pay and that take this option of adjusting the reduction factor into account.
The study of the claiming of retirement benets has received considerably less attention than
retirement itself. Rust and Phelan (1997) explicitly model retirement and application for Social
Security benets, and nd that their dynamic programming model performs quite well in match-
ing the data from the Retirement History Survey regarding employment and claiming of benets.
However, they do not directly model the possibility of affecting future benets by working after
claiming benets. Instead, they include in their structural estimations a series of dummies for indi-
viduals who claim benets and continue to work (p. 813815). Their estimates of these dummies
are positive, and they interpret them as leisure `bonuses' that represent lower disutility of work
after claiming benets. In the absence of the complete incentive scheme, we believe these param-
eters were probably capturing the incentives we emphasize in this paper. It is our contention that
future structural models will likely choose to include the incentives we describe and test as a better
alternative to explaining work among Social Security claimers.12
12 Although Rust and Phelan (1997) emphasize that their results are robust to including these dummies, we believe
9Finally, Coile et al. (2002) analyze the Social Security benet claiming behavior and empha-
size the importance of taking into account that individuals are utility maximizers who are likely
to be averse to risk. However, their focus is not on the connection between claiming and labor
supply, but on understanding why some individuals delay claiming beyond age 62. They do, how-
ever, acknowledge the importance of modeling the claiming decision jointly with the retirement
decision.
3 Analytical Framework and Identication Strategy
Public pensions are a major source of income to older Americans. Under the Old Age and Survivor
Insurance (OASI) system, the Social Security program that pays benets to eligible workers who
claim their benets, 40 million individuals received about $399.8 billion in benets in 2004, and
during that same year around 157 million individuals had earnings covered by Social Security and
paid payroll taxes.
3.1 Benet Calculation
Individuals aged 62 or older who had earned income that was subject to the Social Security payroll
tax for at least 10 years since 1951 are eligible for retirement benets under the Old Age bene-
ts program. Earnings are subject to the tax up to an income maximum that is updated annually
according to increases in the average wage. Around 6% of the 157 million workers with Social
Security taxable earnings in 2004 had earnings at or above the maximum amount. To determine
the monthly benet amount (MBA), the Social Security Administration calculates the Primary In-
surance Amount (PIA) of a worker. The PIA is calculated as a concave piece-wise linear function
the t of their model would improve if work after claiming is allowed to inuence future benets.
10of the worker's average earnings subject to Social Security taxes taken over her 35 years of highest
earnings. The PIA of all individuals eligible for OA benets is computed and updated (increased)
annually in January to reect changes in the individual's earnings history (see SSA-H, §706. De-
termining the PIA, §721. Recomputation of the PIA).13
If the benets are claimed at the NRA (65 and 6 months for those born in 1940) the MBA
equals the PIA. If an individual decides to begin receiving benets before the NRA and exits the
labor force or stays below the earnings limit, her MBA is currently reduced by up to 22.5 percent.
This reduction due to claiming benets before the NRA is approximately actuarially fair, i.e. for
a person with average life expectancy the total amount of Social Security benets received is the
same regardless of the initiationdate. Under the current regulationof the OA program, the monthly
benet amount received upon rst claiming benets depends on the age (month) of initiation of
























































if claimed within the 3 years before NRA
￿
where MBAt represents the monthly benet amount before the NRA (see SSA-S 2003, p.17).
Assuming that the individual continues to receive benets, her MBAt is permanently reduced. The
Actuarial Reduction Factor (ARF) underlying this calculation is a permanent reduction of benets
by 5/9 of 1 percent per month for each month in which benets are received in the three years
13 This recomputation is done regardless of the level of earnings that the individual obtains after claiming benets.
Therefore individuals will benet as long as they can substitute a low year of earnings, which could mean in some
cases to substitute a year without covered earnings. Notice that this recomputationis done implicitly for non-claimers,
therefore the incentive to work to affect the PIA directly through higher earnings affects claimers and non-claimers in
the same way.
11immediately prior to the NRA. The reduction of benets is 5/12 of 1 percent for every month
before that. Thus, the maximum actuarial reduction will reach 30% as the NRA increases to 67
over the next few years (see SSA-S 2003, p.17).14
3.2 Actuarial Reduction Factor
One important feature of the process of benet reduction due to early retirement is the possibility
to reduce the penalty even after initiating the receipt of benets. The specics of this adjustment
to the Actuarial Reduction Factor are documented in the Social Security Handbook (SSA-H, §724.
Basic reduction formulas, §728. Adjustment of reduction factor at FRA) and in the internal oper-
ating manual used by Social Security eld employees when processing claims for Social Security
benets (SSA-M, RS00615. Computation of Monthly Benets Amounts) but may not be well-
understood by the retirees.15 To illustrate the ARF, suppose the NRA is 65 years and six months,
and an individual claims benets at age 62 and n months, where n
￿
￿








￿ , and suspends receiving checks after that until she turns 65 and six
































￿ PIA if claimed within the 3 years before NRA
￿
14 During the post NRA period additional adjustments exist: Workers claiming benets after the NRA earn the
Delayed Retirement Credit. For those born in 1943 or later it is 2/3 of 1% for each month up to age 70 which is
considered actuarially fair. For those born before 1943 it ranges from 11/24 to 5/8 of 1% per month, depending on
their birth year.
15 The Social Security Administration does not use the term Actuarial Reduction Factor in their publications, but a
number of the people we have talked to within the administration do use this terminology. In publications the related
concept of Reduction Factor(s) (RF) which is simply the number of months in which benets were received before
the NRA is used. The RF maps into a Fraction that ranges between 0.7 and 1. The latter corresponds to what we
refer to as ARF. The ARF (Fraction) is adjusted upwards at the NRA according to the number of months before the
NRA in which benets were withheld.






































It is important to note that the adjustment of the ARF is automatic and becomes effective only after
reaching the NRA.16 Thus, given the current law, someone who has claimed benets early and
considers whether to continue to work, or considers to return to work after a leisure spell, has two
incentives to stay in the labor force and to suspend the receipt of (some) Social Security benets
before the NRA. Firstly, the months before the NRA when no benets are received increase the
MBA after the NRA. Secondly, any benets received before reaching the NRA remain at the same
(reduced) rate that corresponds to the time of early benet initiation. As a result the MBA for
individuals who do not receive benets for some months after claiming (e.g. due to the Social
Security Earnings Test withholding as discussed below) becomes increasingly actuarially unfair as
the number of months no benets have been received since claiming rises.
3.3 Earnings Test
The earnings limit denes the maximum amount of income from work that a beneciary who
claims benets before the NRA under OASI may earn while still receiving the 'full' MBA. Earn-
ings above the limit are taxed at a rate of 50 percent for beneciaries between age 62 and the
January of the year in which they reach the NRA, and 33 percent from January of that year until
the month they reach the NRA (SSA-S 2003, p.18; SSA-S 2004, Table 2.A18). For the latter pe-
riod, the earnings limit is higher, $31,080, compared with $11,640 for the earlier period as of 2004
(SSA-S 2004, Table 2.A29). Starting in 2000 the Earnings Test was eliminated for individualsover
16 Beneciaries can withdraw their application for benets. If it is retroactive, any Social Security benets received
must be returned. As a result, those who are aware of this option and who time their applications well may be able to
adjust their reduction factor before the NRA, at the expense of temporarily losing the insurance function that claiming
early may serve as discussed below.
13the NRA. In the context of the reversibility of an early retirement penalty we want to stress that
an increase in the Earnings Test Limit would make it more difcult for individuals to undo this
penalty. This is due to the fact that the higher the Earnings Test Limit, the higher the earnings of
an individual have to be in order to affect her ARF once she has claimed benets.
Individualswhocontinueorre-enter employmentafter initiatingSocialSecurity benets before
the NRA, and whose earning power or hours constraints are such that their income from work
is around or below the earnings limit, are mailed their monthly check from Social Security and
are locked-in at the reduced benet rate permanently. Those with earnings above the limit will
not receive checks for some months and thereby increase their ARF.17 During the rst year after
claiming benets, SSA performs a monthly test to determine whether the person should receive
the monthly check. As a result, an early claimer who is not working or earns below the limit in
the months after claiming will receive all monthly benets even if earnings for that calendar year
(grace year) exceed the Earnings Test Limit due to high earnings before claiming.18 After the
rst year, the test is typically yearly and it depends on the expected earnings of the individual.
Individuals can inform Social Security to suspend the monthly benet payment if they believe they
will be generating earnings that exceed the Earnings Test Limit. Those who are initially not aware
that their benets withheld due to the Earnings Test are not lost, may learn about this feature of
Social Security when discussing the consequences of continuing to work or re-entering the labor
market on a job that generates earnings above the limit with their claim specialist or upon inquiry
after receiving fewer monthly benet checks.
17 A beneciary may receive a partial monthly benet at the end of the tax year if there are excess earnings that do
not completely offset the monthly benet amount (see SSA-H, §1806).
18 Social Security claim specialists emphasized to us that during the rst year after claiming they do what is most
advantageous to the claimer, the monthly or the yearly test, if they have enough information. However, they failed
to clarify what that means, some of them said the number of checks individuals receive is maximized, but we were
unable to nd documentationof such practices. In any case, the internal operating instructions used by Social Security
eld employees when processing claims for Social Security benets state that the monthly earnings test only applies
for the calendar year when benets are initiated unless the type of benet changes (see SSA-M, RS02501.030).
143.4 Hypothesis and Identication Strategy
The ability to affect the reduction factor even after claiming and the fact that the adjustment to the
rate only occurs after reaching the NRA has important implication for labor force exit behavior.
For those who claimed before the NRA (early claimers), continuing to work or returning to
work and earn above the annual Earnings Test Limit ($11,640 in the years before reaching the
NRA $31,080 for the time between January and the month when the NRA is reached in the year
thereafter) is the only way to achieve a higher permanent benet rate after the NRA. Someone
who has not yet claimed benets (non-claimer), on the other hand, can affect his or her rate of
future benet pay independently of working simply by continuing to not claim benets. While
the reduced benet rate is approximately actuarially fair for individuals who claim and withdraw
from the labor force at the same time (or earn below the Earnings Test Limit after claiming), it is
not for individuals who claim early, have a working spell that results in (some) benets withheld
due to the Earnings Test and then retire or earn below the limit prior to reaching the NRA. Since
the benet rate is not adjusted for the months when no benets were received prior to NRA, the
lifetime benets of early claimers who continue to work after claiming would only be actuarially
fair relative to non-claimers if all benets were withheld before the NRA. In other words, for early
claimers who continue working and earn above the limit, hence see their benets withheld, Social
Security benets received before the NRA become increasingly actuarially unfair with the number
of months benets were withheld compared to those who have not claimed at that time or those
who claimed and retired immediately.
If the option to adjust the reduction factor even after claiming benets by working and earning
above the earnings limit to have benets withheld, and the incentives provided by the increasingly
actuarially unfair adjustment rules for those who claim and continue to work or return to work
15matter, we expect to see those who have claimed benets withdrawing from the labor force in a
different way than those who have not claimed benets at the time.
Specically, the increasingly actuarially unfair benet level constitutes a (negative) income
effect on labor supply. Consequently, we rst predict that some of the early claimers who are
working at the time when they claim Social Security benets will participate in the labor market
longer (in order to collect higher benets later and to avoid reduced benets at an unadjusted rate)
than individuals in the labor force who have not claimed at that time. Secondly, there should be
some early claimers who rst exit the labor force but later re-enter who will also stay employed
longer than non-claimers who re-enter. As discussed before, by continuing to work (or by re-
entering the labor force) and earning above the Earnings Test Limit, early claimers can not only
suspendthe receipt of monthlybenets for a longer time, thereby tradingoff reduced benets today
for upwards-adjusted benets after reaching the NRA, but also avoid receiving the unadjusted
benets before the NRA which are (increasingly) actuarially unfair. Since the ability of a labor
force participant who has not claimed at the time to achieve a greater future rate of benet pay
is not tied to earnings (thus working) and the reduction in benets she faces is approximately
actuarially fair, non-claimers are expected to exit the labor force at a baseline rate that is, on
average, greater than the exit rate of early claimers who work after claiming. As the duration since
early benet initiation increases the incentives further predict that early claimers are increasingly
likely to continue working (i.e. increasingly less likely to exit) compared to non-claimers.
The identication strategy presented above relies on the variation in claiming and working be-
havior. Specically, our identication of the incentives of the adjustment of the rate of benet pay
after claiming provided by the current rules of the Earnings Test and the ARF, relies on the vari-
ation in the length of working spells of early claimers and later claimers. The latter includes both
individuals who claim at a reduced rate but closer towards the NRA or those who claim at NRA or
16thereafter. Given that the reduction in benets associated with early retirement is actuarially fair
for the average individual (average life expectancy) it is clear that early claiming and continuation
of work or return to work will be less prevalent behavior than claiming and withdrawing at about
the same time. And in fact, the evidence from the HRS provided in Figure 1 demonstrates such a
pattern. However, Figure 1 also shows a sizable percentage of early claimers continue to work as
discussed above.
There are several motivations for claiming benets at or after age 62 while continuing to work
or expecting a return to work, since having led for benets provides a type of insurance: (a)
Individuals who face uncertain job prospects or uncertain income streams in general (and those
who are more risk averse) may le for Social Security benets as soon as they are eligible to secure
benet payments if needed. Processing the initial Social Security claim takes up to 3 months.
Reinstating the monthly payments takes around 6 weeks. Also, in most states unemployment
benets are not deducted from Social Security benets and vice-versa, i.e. unemployment benets
and Social Security benets can be received at the same time. (b) With the ongoing debate about
reformingthe Social Security system,individualseligiblefor early retirement benets maybecome
claimers even though they do not plan to withdraw from the labor force. Their motivation is to
insure that they cannot be made worse off by subsequent changes to the Social Security system.
Given that the full incentive scheme provided by the Earnings Test and the ARF are fairly
complexitisunlikelythatallolderAmericansare aware ofthem. Ben´ tez-SilvaandHeiland(2005)
estimate that no more than 30% of older Americans may know about these incentives suggesting
that it may be difcult to draw inference about them. However, even if individuals are initially
(e.g., before or even at the time of claiming) unaware that they can affect their benet reduction
factor after claiming or are misinformed about the incentives provided by the Earnings Test, they
may learn about these incentivesand may exercisethe optionto reverse the early retirement penalty
17as: (a) they realize that the reduced rate is not sufcient to achieve the current or future desired
standard of living, (b) their preferences for leisure or consumptionchanges, and (c) the opportunity
costs for leisure increase, for example as a result of a job opportunitythat yields earnings above the
Earnings Test Limit. In each case, some individuals may continue a working spell after claiming
or return to the labor market, earn above the limit to affect the reduction factor and be more likely
to stay in the labor force as the time since claiming and before the NRA increases and the monthly
benets at the reduced rate become more actuarially unfair.
The theoretical discussion suggests that, on average, early claimers should exit the labor force
more slowly than non-claimers and that the difference in the dropout rate between the two widens
as the number of months since benet initiation but before the NRA increases. To test for this
potential non-linear effect of the time since benet claiming on labor force participation, we an-
alyze the exit hazard of Americans of early retirement age conditional on the time since benet
claiming. Two issues that need to be addressed in the empirical analysis of our hypothesis are
individual-specic factors that may independently affect a person's risk of labor force exit, and
the potential endogeneity of claiming behavior. Failure to control for such independent factors,
and failure to account for the possibility that individuals consider the optimal timing of the benet
claiming when choosing the working spell after age 62 (or after they returned to the labor force),
may at best obscure the interpretation of the effect of the duration since claiming on labor force
exit and at worst lead to biased estimates.
As shown in greater detail below, we address the rst concern by controlling for a large set
of background characteristics of the individual including time-varying covariates and measures of
physical and mental health and subjective survival probability. If the covariates proxy well for
differences in the determinants of individual's labor force exit risks including tastes and endow-
ments (health and cognitive ability), the estimated effects are more likely to capture the predicted
18effect of time since claiming on a person's labor force participation risk. We also comment on
results of specications that model a common form of unobserved heterogeneity directly in the
hazard function (Frailty Model, see Vaupel et al. 1979).19 To address the potential endogeneity
of the timing of benet claiming on the labor force participation spell, we use Lillard's (1993)
simultaneous equations for hazards approach.
4 Data and Econometric Models
In this section we present the samples and measures used in the empirical analysis and the econo-
metric models we estimate in section 5.
4.1 Data Description and Summary Statistics
Using monthly employment data of 7,203 men and women from the rst ve waves of the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS), we construct measures of the time-to-exit from the labor force for
individuals who are employed continuously from age 62 ('Exit-Sample') and those who exit the
labor force after re-entering sometime after 62 ('Re-Exit-Sample').20 We also construct monthly
indicators of claiming behavior whichgiven data limitationsreect the month the individual
started receiving Social Security Old Age benets.21
19 Unobservedheterogeneity in survival analysis is particularly problematic. If some individuals are more at risk to
exit the labor force due to an unobservedcharacteristic, then the group of individuals remaining in the labor force tend
to be a selected group with lower exit risk. What we interpret as evidence for a causal relationship between the time
sincean individualinitiatedbenetsandherriskofdroppingfromthelaborforcemaybetheresult ofdifferencesin the
proneness to exit the labor force across individuals, if no effort to account for observed and unobserved heterogeneity
is made.
20 Within the group of individuals whose status changed from employed to not employed ('exited'), we do not
distinguish individuals who became unemployed, since the fraction of respondents exiting due to unemployment is
less than 2% in the relevant age group.
21 Given the structure of the questions in the HRS we are unable to verify whether the respondent continuously
receives benets. If none of the respondents in the sample had their benets withheld our identication strategy, as
explained in the previous section, should fail to capture any effect of the time since claiming on labor force exit.
19Given our research question we do not follow individuals past the month of their 65th birthday.
The employment spell for individuals who have not withdrawn from the labor force prior to that
month will be right-censored.22 Subjects with missing data that imply left-censoring are dropped.
For the exit sample the observed spells start from the month of the respondent's 62nd birthday
(minimum age of eligibility for early retirement). In the case of re-entrants to the labor market, we
consider the rst employment spell after a non-working spell that includes the month of the 62nd
birthday.23 To illustrate how the samples are obtained, we note that of the 7,203 individuals in the
HRS who are 62 or older, 3,381 have a complete work history after turning 62, and among those
the 1,723 individuals who are working at 62 constitute our exit sample. As for the re-exit sample,
we nd that there are 477 individuals with complete work history who re-enter the labor market
after 62.
The frequency distributionsof the employmentspells in both samples are shownin Table 1. We
observe that in the exit sample males have longer working spells than females, and that claimers
have slightly longer spells than non-claimers. The latter is due mainly to the fact that non-claimers
are likely to be younger and therefore more likely to be censored.
In the re-exit sample there are no differences between males and females in the length of
the working spell. On the other hand, claimers appear to have shorter employment spells after
re-entering the labor force. However, this unconditional analysis does not take into account the
censoring probability, which is correlated with the age of the respondent. The duration models
below are able to account for this.
22 Since we use data up to the year 2000, the NRA for most individuals in our samples is 65. Only individuals who
turn 62 in 2000 have the higher NRA of 65 and 2 months. It is clear that the latter individuals are right-censored (or
have completed the employment spell) before reaching their NRA in our samples.
23 In this paper we do not extend the analysis to multiple spells. Notice that this could be done in two ways. (a) The
two samples that are used separately in this paper can be combined into one. In that case some individuals experience
two exit spells. (b) One can include higher order exit spells of individuals from the second sample.
20Table 2 provides summary statistics for the earnings and hours of work in the calendar year
corresponding to each month of the event of work/not work, claim/not claim in the exit and re-
entrant sample. Males have higher earnings on average, and so do non-claimers. Claimers have
earnings higher than the limits of the Earnings Test, which suggests that the average claimers who
work mightseek to increase the rate of future benet pay, i.e. increase the ARF. This does not seem
to be the case for the claimers who re-enter the labor force. Notice, however, the large standard
deviations of the earnings measures, suggesting that there are a substantial number of individuals
below the Earnings Test Limit also in the exit sample. The distribution of average hours of work is
consistent with the earnings distribution.
As shown in Table 3 our sample consists of single employment-spell data on individuals who
turn 62 between 1992 and 2000. We employ a large set of explanatory variables. To construct the
time-varying covariates we assign characteristics from the closest previous survey wave available
in each month. The sample of all employed individuals at age 62 ('Sample 1' or 'Exit-Sample')
consists of 1,723 individuals with 24,097 person-months observed. The sample of all re-entrants
('Sample 2' or 'Re-Exit-Sample') consists of 438 individuals with 3,106 person-months observed.
To capture the effect of the incentives provided by the benet rate adjustment process in the
decisionofwhentoexitthelaborforce we includetimesinceclaimingandthetimebeforeclaiming
in the exithazard. To distinguishthosewho have notclaimed yet ina particular monthwe construct
a dummy variable, Not Claimed Yet, that equals 1 if the month is prior to becoming a claimer and
0 otherwise. We also include an indicator for the month when benets are initiated.
We expect thaton averagethe labor force exit hazard will be higher for individuals who
have claimed benets than for those who have not, as many individuals claim at the time they
retire, orsoonafterwards, oncetheyreach age62. Thereafter, weexpectforthereasonsexplained
abovethat time since claiming exhibits positive duration dependence on the working hazard, i.e.
21the longer someone who has claimed benets early stays in the labor force the smaller her exit
hazard becomes compared to someone who has not claimed at the time, holding everything else
constant. To capture this potentially non-linear effect the exit hazard models include a linear and a
quadratic term for the time since benets were claimed.
Furthermore, the incentives provided by Social Security suggest that the later individuals ini-
tiate benets after turning 62 the less incentive they have to stay in the labor force to affect the
reduction rate associated with claiming early. In other words, we expect a positive relationship
between the number of months since 62 and before claiming benets, and the exit hazard.
To be able to identify the hypothesized non-linear effect of time since claiming on labor force
exit, we control for a large set of factors that are expected to inuence the labor force exit decision
independently of the time since claiming, such as measures relating to nancial constraints, health
limitations, opportunity costs, and tastes.24 As proxies of a person's market earnings power we
use measures of educational attainment, cognitive ability and work-related health limitations as
reported in Table 3. Together with marital status and subjective life expectancy, poor health may
also capture leisure preferences. The availability and type of health insurance, pension wealth, and
asset wealth are expected to play an important role in the decisions of when to withdraw from the
labor force. Hence we have constructed an indicator for individuals without health insurance (non-
missing for 84-88% of the respondents in the samples) and for those with private health insurance
(84-88% non-missing). The individual's wealth during this part of the life cycle is measured by
net total household wealth (77-83% non-missing), and an indicator for whether they have a private
pensions (97-99% non-missing). Using the restricted earnings data from the HRS we have con-
structed a person's PIA, i.e. a measure of the respondent's actuarially fair Social Security wealth
24 We follow standard specications used in the empirical literature on labor supply of older workers (see e.g.,
Lumsdaine and Mitchell 1999).
22based on their history of earnings (79% non-missing).25 The PIA is potentially importantin
conjunction with private pensions and net (non-pension) wealthnot only as a control for wealth
in the labor supply decision but also to understand the claiming behavior as investigated in the
simultaneous hazard model below.
4.2 Single Equation Models
To empirically assess the role of the incentive to continue working provided by the penalty ad-
justment mechanism in the retirement decision between ages 62 and the NRA, we estimate hazard
models of labor force exit (or 'time-to-exit models'). As discussed above, the effects are identi-
ed by the variation in behavior found in the data between early claimers (before the NRA) and
later claimers, controlling for other determinants of an individual's proneness to withdraw from
the labor market in a given month.







with error sei and observable covariates Xi. Among the regressors we include measures of the
individual i's claiming behavior. For example, if we include the time since claim initiation as
the jth covariate, Xi
￿ j, then our hypothesis that earlier claimers stay employed longer (i.e. have a
greater survival time T) than later claimers, implies that bj
￿ 0. Given that we have censoring in
the employment data we estimate the claiming effects from labor force exit hazard models.
25 The restricted earnings data provide the history of earnings for the 9,472 individuals, as of the rst wave of
interviews, that gave permission to link their les, from 1951 to 1991. Haider and Solon (2000) nd little evidence
of non-randomness and lack of representativeness in this sub-sample of individuals. The PIA we include in our
estimations uses these histories and then imputes earnings up to the individuals' 62nd birthday in order to calculate the
retirement benets as of that age. For the months after that we just use the monthly actuarial adjustment factor.
23We present results using a piece-wise linear baseline hazard specication building on the Gom-
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In particular, in the Gompertz model shown below, where we use nodes at 3 months, 6 months, 12

























It is important to understand that this baseline duration pattern captures the average effect of time
after age 62 on the exit hazard based on all individuals. With the inclusion of the time since claim-
ing measures we capture the potential differential effect that the time passed since the claiming
date may have on early claimers' risk of exiting, controlling for other factors including the effect
of time since age 62 captured by the baseline duration pattern. The estimation of the model is
conducted using aML (Lillard and Panis 2003).
26 We have conducted extensive sensitivity analysis of the functional form of the baseline exit hazard, by assuming
different distributions for the e. We have re-estimated our single equation models assuming that e is extreme value
type II distributed then the hazard function for labor force exit takes the known Weibull form. To contrast the results
from the Weibull hazard model with a functional form that allows for non-monotonic baseline duration dependence,
we have also estimated specications based on the log-normal hazard function by assuming that the error term of the
log survival time, e, follows the normal distribution. The estimation results assuming these different distributions do
not change the ndings we will present in any signicant way. In order to simplify the exposition of the results we
have decided not to report those additional estimation results, but they can be obtained from the authors upon request.
27 Due to the comparatively small number of observations, in the re-exit sample we have only been able to identify
four nodes for the baseline duration spline for this group, at 3, 6, 12, and more than 12 months.
24In an alternative specication, shown in the columns labeled (2) in Table 4, we have added a
Time Before Claiming measure (in months) and its square. If the incentives due to the ARF matter,
we expect the Time Before Claiming to increase the likelihood of exiting the labor force.
We make several attempts to minimize the potential inuence of unobserved individual-level
differences in the exit hazard. Omission of variables that relate to the individual's risk (Frailty)
of experiencing an event (labor force exit or benet claiming) may lead to biased estimates (see
Struthers and Kalbeisch 1986 and Gail et al. 1984). We rst attempt to address this concern
by controlling for a large set of background characteristics of the individual in all specications.
These characteristics include, educational attainment, health, cognitive ability, subjective survival
probability, nances, etc. If these covariates proxy well for differences in individuals' ability,
tastes, and endowments, the estimated claiming coefcients are more likely to reect the under-
lying effect of the incentives on labor supply. Since it is difcult to assess the reliability of these
variables as proxies, we also estimate Weibull and Log-Normal mixture models that explicitly ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity by including a random effect in the hazard function. These









￿ (see Vaupel et al. 1979). They arise
from a multiplicative random heterogeneity effect, a, which is assumed to follow a mean-one and
nite-variance q distribution. Individuals with a
￿ 1 are said to be more prone to exit the labor
market than others for reasons not explained by the covariates. We consider the case where the
a is a Gamma random variable (with parameters 1
" q and q). Models of this type can account
for unobserved individual-level differences in the exit risk of an individual including differences
in attachment to the labor force, knowledge about the adjustment process, or the degree of risk
aversion.
254.3 Simultaneous Hazards Model
A potential concern with the single equation models is that the risk of claiming benets and the
risk of withdrawing from the labor force are jointly determined. It is likely that individuals con-
sider the optimal timing of benet claiming when choosing whether to continue working after age
62. In that case, the risk of claiming at some month and variables derived from this outcome,
which include our main variable of interest, the time since claiming, may not be exogenous in the
working hazard. They may be subject to the same unobserved characteristics (such as tastes and
endowments) that affect the length of the working spell. For example, some individuals may have
above average attachment to the labor force for reasons unrelated to the incentives provided by the
benet adjustment rules (e.g. since they are initially in a job that is a particularly good match). If
they are also more likely to claim benets early (e.g. since they are also particularly risk averse) an
estimated negative effect of the time since claiming on the exit hazard may reect their unobserved
motives for delaying exit after claiming rather than the incentives provided by the early retirement
rules of Social Security. To address potential problemsof unobserved heterogeneityin exit risk that
are transmitted via the outcome of the claiming process, we estimate the claiming and the labor
force exit process jointly, allowing for unobserved components in each process, and the possibility
that these determinants are correlated.
Our estimation approach is based on the full information maximum likelihood `simultaneous
equations for hazards' model of Lillard (1993).28 This approach assumes that the duration pro-
cesses may be correlated via individual-specic unobserved heterogeneity components that follow
a bivariate normal distribution. Specically, we estimate the following system of labor force exit
28 The framework is commonly adopted to estimate multiprocess duration problems. This methodology has been
applied,forexample,tostudythedeterminantsofwelfareparticipation,familyformationandresolution,andeducation
(see Brien and Lillard 1994, Brien et al. 1999, Upchurch et al. 2002, and Fitzgerald and Ribar 2004, among others).



















































where the baseline duration patterns in both equations are allowed to be different, and the exoge-
nous control variables,Y1,Y2 can be the same. As in the singleequation models above, XCi contains
measures that capture the effect of claiming on the exit from the labor force. In the baseline speci-
cation we control for whether a person has Not Claimed Yet in a given month, and conditional on
that, the Month when Claimed, the Time Since Claiming was initiated (in months), and its square.
We note that we also allow the claiming hazard to depend on the outcome of the labor force par-
ticipation process via XE.
The joint probabilities of observed outcomes and events (claiming dates, exit dates, completed
or censored) conditional on the vector of unobserved heterogeneity components (eE, eC) is the








￿ for individuali) since
they are statistically independent.29 Consequently, the contribution to the joint likelihood of indi-
vidual i's complete set of outcomes is the integral of the joint conditional likelihood over the range


































The coefcient vector is estimated using the aML Multiprocess MultilevelModeling software (Lil-
lard and Panis 2003). Estimation of this type of multiprocess hazard model using single spell data
is difcult. In the estimation of our sample we only identify the correlation coefcient. The vari-
ances of the two unobserved heterogeneity terms are set to unity.30
29 The heterogeneity this procedure allows us to control for is individual-specic. Notice that any unobserved
heterogeneity due to transitory shocks, beyond those captured by our time controls, cannot be identied with this
approach.
30 We note that identication of the variance components has been shown theoretically (Heckman and Honor´ e
275 Empirical Results
5.1 Single Equation (Re-)Exit Analysis
Single equation estimation results for the exit and the re-exit sample are presented in Table 4.
Specication (2) in the table, differs from specication (1) in that the former also controls for the
duration between the time of the 62nd birthday and the claiming of benets. All models include
a large set of covariates that control for socio-economic background and health characteristics of
the individual. Also includedbut not shown in the tableare a set of indicators for region of
residence and calendar year of the 62nd birthday. In the table a positive coefcient indicates an
increased hazard, or higher likelihood of dropping from the sample of workers. As discussed
above, we have also estimated Weibull and Log-Normal frailty models to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. Since the results suggest that there is no evidence that the exit hazard models are
misspecied due to omitted covariates we decided not to report them here.31
Exit Model
For the two specications shown in Table 4, the Time Since Claiming variable has the sign hypoth-
esized and is statistically signicant. The longer it is since someone has claimed early benets, the
more likely theyare to stay in the labor force compared with someone who has not claimed benets
at that time. The square term is positive and signicant, indicating that the exit hazard decreases
at a decreasing rate in the number of months since claiming. The net effect of time since claiming
is negative, indicating a lower likelihood of dropping out of the labor force, which supports the
1989).
31 The coefcients and standard errors in the exit models with frailty were almost identical and the variance of
the heterogeneity component was close to zero. The results are available from the authors upon request. The re-exit
models did not converge using the Gamma frailty which is likely to be the result of the small sample size.
28importance of the incentives provided by the rules regarding the adjustment of the reduction factor.
Notice the large effect that the indicator of not having claimed yet has on decreasing the likeli-
hood of dropping from the labor force. This control is necessary to account for the level shifter
that indicates that those who have not claimed as of that month are unconditionally more likely
to participate in the labor market. The sizable coefcient captures the increased exit probability
associated with becoming eligible for early retirement benets after turning 62 typically found in
studies of retirement behavior during the 1990s. Also consistent with the fact that many early
claimers retire when they claim, the indicator of month of claim increases the retirement hazard,
which indicates that a number of respondents retire in the same month they claim benets.
A number of other coefcients have the expected sign, with higher wealth decreasing the haz-
ard, and the presence of private pension or a higher primary insurance amount (public pension)
increasing the hazard.32 We also nd that if the respondent is the primary respondent (the nan-
cially knowledgeable person in the household), he or she is less likely to withdraw from the labor
force. The health insurance variables we include, lack of health insurance, and having private in-
surance, havemostlyinsignicanteffectsacross specications. Nothavinghealthinsurancehasthe
expected negative effect on dropping from the labor force, but this coefcient is very imprecisely
estimated.33
We also identify the indicators for the piece-wise linear baseline duration pattern of labor force
32 We observea strongerand statistically signicant effectofprivatepensiononthe exit hazardacross specications
ifthePIAisexcludedfromthemodel(resultsavailablefromtheauthorsuponrequest),whichsuggeststhatthereported
estimates of the pension effects may be subject to multicollinearity since individuals with high PIAs are also likely to
have private pensions. In any case, the pattern of the claiming effects is robust to the pension specication. The effect
of private pensionsif the PIA is not includedis consistent with the interpretations a number of researchers make
of the fact that a considerable numberof individuals are not working after age 62 but at the same time are not claiming
benets. A number of pension plans penalize individuals who receive Social Security benets while accumulating
pension balances, in other cases individuals prefer to wait to receive their full PIA while supporting themselves on
their pensions. We thank John Sabelhaus for helping us understand this issue.
33 Currie and Madrian (1999) provide a review of the literature on the effects of health insurance on labor market
decisions.
29exit behavior. For this sample of respondents all those duration indicators are signicant and depict
an interesting pattern, which shows that during the rst three months after turning 62 there is an
increased hazard of exit from the labor force, followed by a decreased hazard in months 3 to 6
after the 62nd birthday. The hazard again increases for months 6 to 12, and decreases for durations
between 1 and 3 years. Finally, for those reaching their 65th birthday there is a large and signicant
increased hazard of exiting the labor force in the month they turn 65 and the month after, an effect
consistent with the traditional observed retirement peak at that age.
The second specication for the exit sample adds an indicator of Time Before Claiming and its
square, a variable that indicates the number of months between age 62 and the time of claiming.
The coefcient on the linear term has the hypothesized positive effect on the hazard, since longer
durations before claiming indicate an increased likelihood of retirement compared with those that
have claimed. The square term has a negative effect on the probability of exiting the labor force
due to the fact that a signicant number of individuals claim benets around their 65th birthday.
The remaining results are essentially unchanged.
Re-Exit Model
In this case the estimates are quite noisy and almost none of the coefcients of interest is statisti-
cally different from zero. The small number of observations seems to be the main problem here.
We conclude from this that possibly an analysis with multiple spells, and a separate examination
of the determinants of re-entry might be appropriate to clarify the importance of the emphasized
incentives in this population.
305.2 Simultaneous Analysis of Exit and Claiming
Table 5 shows the results of estimating the claiming and the exit hazards simultaneously using the
exit sample and following the identication strategy described in Lillard (1993).34 In the rst set
of results the exit hazard includes the same variables as specication (1) in the single equation
models. The second model includes a variable that captures the fraction of the year before turning
62 that a respondent participated in the labor market. We include this measure to assess if the
results are driven by individual heterogeneity with regard to labor force attachment. The results of
both models are essentially the same.
The main results do not differ much from those of the single equation analysis, even though
the correlation coefcient between equations is estimated to be positive, large, and signicantly
different from zero. The coefcient of the Time Since Claiming measure is marginally larger in
absolute value in the joint estimation than in Table 4, suggesting that there is little evidence for
simultaneity bias in the time since claiming measures. While the difference in the effect is small,
the statistical signicance of the correlation coefcient is some evidence in support of the joint
estimation strategy. Its positive sign is consistent with the presence of unobserved characteristics
of the individual that affect the exit and claiming behavior in a similar way. While we cannot
identify the exact nature of these characteristics we suspect they are mostly related to productivity
and health differences across individuals that are not captured otherwise.35 After controlling for
the previous attachment to the labor force the correlation weakens somewhat indicating that this
variable is an important determinant that affects the exiting and claiming probabilities in the same
34 We did not nd the results reported below to be sensitive to considering specications where some exclusion
restrictions (more or less difcult to defend) are made. Given that the estimates below support the evidence we have
presented throughout the paper, we argue that the structural assumptions imposed in the estimation of the bivariate
hazard model do not buy us the main results of this research, but rather show the robustness of those results.
35 We have conductedextensive sensitivity analysis regardingthe variances of the unobservedcomponents in equa-
tions 6 and 7 using a grid search approach. The correlation coefcient is in all cases positive and signicant, and the
remaining coefcient estimates are not substantially different from those reported in Table 5.
31(negative) way.
We can observe that, other things equal, an early claim of benets decreases the hazard of drop-
ping from the labor force, a result consistent with a signicant effect of the labor supply incentives
represented by the ARF. As in the single-equation models, the dropout risk increases after claim-
ing and the greatest increase occurs soon after claiming as shown by the negative coefcient on
the linear term and the positive coefcient on the quadratic. The model predicts that an individual
who has claimed benets in a particular month is about 21.1% less likely to drop from the labor
force in the following month than an individual who has not claimed benets and is still in the
labor force.36 An individual who claimed benets 6 months ago is about 71.1% less likely to drop
from the labor force a month later than an individual who has not claimed benets and continues
to work. This percentage goes up to 87% if the individual claimed benets a year ago.
We again observe the negative effect on the hazard of being the primary respondent and having
more wealth. This negative effect can also be observed for those with higher self-reported proba-
bilities of living to age 85, suggesting a coherent effect of self-assessed longevity. Having a health
limitation, as we saw in the single equation model, has a positive effect on the hazard of exiting the
labor force. As before we observe the expected positivesigns of the effect of the primary insurance
amount and of having a private pension in the labor force exit hazard. However, these effects are
not statistically signicant at the 10% signicance level.
Regarding the baseline hazard we observe that, as in the Gompertz model, in the three months
after turning 62 the retirement hazard increases, but decreases in the 3 to 6 months period, and
increases again in the 6 to 12 month period. In this case the hazard keeps increasing after that,
and is especially high at the time the individual turns 65 and the month after. This overall pattern
36 From Table 5 we use
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32replicates fairly well the known retirement peaks described in the literature.
Turning to the claiming hazard, continuous participation in the labor market reduces the like-
lihood that someone will claim benets. Being the primary respondent increases the likelihood of
claiming, but higher wealth and a higher score in a cognitive test decreases the claiming hazard.
The wealth effect is consistent with the widely accepted believe that wealth proxies for a variety
of characteristics likely to be correlated with delayed retirement, and it is also consistent with the
fact that poorer individuals receive higher replacement rates from the social insurance system. The
results also show that the primary insurance amount plays a more important role in the claiming
than in the labor force participation decision. As expected, a higher PIA increases the likelihood
that claiming of benets is initiated at that time. Interestingly, the duration patterns for the claim-
ing behavior in the months after age 62 matches the pattern in the same months for the exit hazard,
with an increase in the rst 3 month, a decrease in months 3 to 6, and an increase afterwards, with
a clear peak around the person's 65th birthday.
In addition to investigating the robustness of the claiming effects by looking at different base-
line hazard specications and by controlling for the endogeneity of claiming as presented above,
we have also considered alternative specications for all models presented in Tables 4 and 5.37 In
addition to re-estimating all models controlling for labor supply during the 12 months period be-
fore the individual's62nd birthday, as shown in Table 5 for the joint model, we have also included a
dichotomous variable for self-employment status. While the effect of previous labor supply on the
labor force exit hazard has the expected negative sign, the effects of claiming on employment tend
to be unchanged. Furthermore, while self-employed individualsare signicantly less likely to drop
out of the labor force, the qualitative pattern of the claiming effects is unaffected by controlling for
self-employment status.
37 These results are available from the authors upon request.
336 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of the incentives set up by Social Security regarding claiming of
benets and working, which individuals face between the Early Retirement Age and the Normal
Retirement Age. These incentives have been largely ignored by researchers focusing on the retire-
ment decision, and have not been analyzed in a framework that allows for the simultaneity of the
decisions to start receiving benets and working.
We have presented evidence for the presence of positive duration dependence of employment
associated with claiming benets early. The labor supply incentives of the Social Security system
for those that claim benets early have real and sizable effects in a sample of individuals from the
Health and Retirement Study. This result is found consistently across single equation models of
labor force exit and joint models of exit and timing of benet claiming.
Given that the option to affect the reduction factor even after claiming benets early inves-
tigated in this study may not be a very well-known feature of Social Security, our evidence of
their importance for behavior based on data from the Health and Retirement Study may be a lower
bound estimate of their potential effect on retirement behavior if they were made better known. In
particular our ndings suggest that we can expect more benet claiming and greater participation
before the NRA if the percentage of individuals who understand that benets withheld due to the
Earnings Test are not lost but will increase the rate of future benet pay were to rise.
It is clear that, as the population ages, and the number of years between the Early and NRA
increases over time, the incentives provided by the Actuarial Reduction Factor and the Earnings
Test will be even more important since all current and future retirees experience a greater reduction
of benets when claiming early. Some recent remarks by inuential (but independent) policy
makers in the U.S., like Alan Greenspan, indicate that the NRA is likely to increase even further in
34the next few years in order to avoid even more radical (and painful) changes to Social Security. As
the NRA rises, having the option to affect the reduction factor after claiming early becomes more
valuable to individuals. Since the adjustment of the benet rate typically takes place only after the
NRA is reached, benets received before the NRA may become increasingly actuarially unfair for
those who continue to work after claiming in the next years. As a result future cohorts that reach
ERA and consider their options regarding working and benets will nd information regarding
the adjustment of the reduction factor increasingly useful. For that reason, the Social Security
Administration should consider providing additional information about the Actuarial Reduction
Factor, such as an updated version of the benet calculator, and more direct information on their
webpage and the many important details regarding these important policies.
Finally, one of the objectives of this paper is to foster further research on the importance and
behavioral consequences of work after claiming benets, and the option to affect the reduction
factor after claiming. A natural extension is to assess in a dynamic framework the importance of
the incentives provided by the ARF in conjunction with the Earnings Test. This type of model will
also allow researchers to analyze what the potential impact of these incentives is in the presence
of a variety of policy reforms to the U.S. social insurance system, such as changes to the early
and NRA, changes in the actuarial adjustment, changes in the Earnings Test, or the possibility
of strengthening the link between Social Security taxes and Social Security benets through the
investment of part of the payroll taxes in individual accounts. A dynamic framework would also
help to assess the impact of these incentives provided by the social insurance system on the wealth
accumulation and retirement planning behavior of older Americans.
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Month First Exited (’1’=62nd Birthday; ’37’=65th Birthday)
39Table 1: Percentage Distribution of Working Spells
Outcome
Sample Total Number of Subjects Mean Durationa Not Working Censored
Worked at 62 1,723 14.0 36.7 63.3
Male 984 14.6 37.9 62.1
Female 739 13.2 35.2 64.8
Claimerb 474 14.5 53.0 47.0
Non-Claimer 1,249 13.8 30.6 69.4
Re-Exited after 62 438 7.1 39.5 60.5
Male 239 7.1 38.5 61.5
Female 199 7.1 40.7 59.3
Claimerc 211 5.5 33.2 66.8
Non-Claimer 247 7.9 41.7 58.3
Notes: aIn months. bEver benet claimer. cBenets claimed before reentry.
Table 2: Distribution of Earnings and Hours
Earningsa Hours Workedb
Sample Meanc Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Worked at 62 23,626 32,550 1,320 830
(18,474) (21,699)
Male 30,177 39,178 1,410 872
(10,809) (12,927)
Female 14,388 15,598 1,188 746
(7,665) (8,772)
Claimerd 16,406 27,143 1,050 785
(5,264) (6,167)
Non-Claimer 26,503 34,046 1,427 824
(13,210) (15,532)
Re-Exited after 62 9,149 17,382 735 641
(2,129) (2,574)
Male 12,319 22,884 758 690
(1,133) (1,458)
Female 5,545 5,094 704 571
(996) (1,116)
Claimere 5,786 5,581 547 491
(802) (982)
Non-Claimer 11,182 21,332 851 693
(1,327) (1,592)
Notes: aAverage calender year earnings in current US-$. bAverage calendar year hours worked. cNumber of cases
(person-months) in parenthesis. dEver benet claimer. eBenets claimed before reentry.
40Table 3: Means of Variables in Labor Market (Re-)Exit Analysis
Meana
Variable Name Denition Exit Re-Exit
Subject-Invariant
Male 1 if male, 0 otherwise 0.57 (1.00) 0.55 (1.00)
White 1 if white, 0 otherwise 0.78 (1.00) 0.80 (1.00)
No Diploma 1 if no high school diploma, 0 otherwise 0.68 (1.00) 0.68 (1.00)
Voc. Training 1 if vocational training received, 0 otherwise 0.23 (1.00) 0.25 (1.00)
BA 1 if Bachelor degree obtained, 0 otherwise 0.25 (1.00) 0.23 (1.00)
Prof. Degree 1 if professional degree obtained, 0 otherwise 0.09 (1.00) 0.08 (1.00)
Cogn. Test Cognitive Ability Test Score (Scale: 0-14) 6.30 (0.90) 6.15 (0.92)
Worked Previously fraction of months worked in the year prior to the 62 birthday 0.97 (0.96) 0.70 (0.90)
Others 9 regional dummies
Sample Sizeb 1,723 438
Subject-Varyingc
Married 1 if currently married or living together, 0 otherwise 0.77 (0.85) 0.78 (0.89)
Primary Respondent 1 if respondent is the nancially knowledgeable person, 0 otherwise 0.64 (0.86) 0.63 (0.89)
Month Claimed 1 if month when rst received Social Security Benets, 0 otherwise 0.02 (1.00) 0.01 (1.00)
Time since Claimingd number of months since initiation of benets 4.4 (0.28) 15.4 (0.37)
Pr. Living to 85 self-reported probability of living to age 85 0.47 (0.14) 0.45 (0.19)
Health Lim. for Work 1 if health limitations for work exist, 0 otherwise 0.09 (0.85) 0.18 (0.89)
PIA nominal monthly primary insurance amount (PIA) (in $1,000s) 0.73 (0.79) 0.71 (0.79)
Net Wealth total net household wealth (in $100,000s) 2.82 (0.83) 2.10 (0.77)
Private Pension 1 if has private pension, 0 otherwise 0.54 (0.99) 0.51 (0.97)
No Insurance 1 if no health insurance currently, 0 otherwise 0.06 (0.84) 0.12 (0.88)
Private Insurance 1 if has private health insurance, 0 otherwise 0.23 (0.84) 0.24 (0.88)
Hourly Pay 1 if job pays hourly, 0 otherwise 0.53 (0.20) 0.60 (0.16)
Hours Worked total hours worked in the corresponding calendar year 1,320 (0.90) 735 (0.83)
Earnings total earnings from wages in the correspondingcalendar year 23,626 (0.77) 9,149 (0.69)
Sample Sizee 24,097 3,106
Notes: aMean for subject-varying variables is computed using the overall mean. Fraction of subjects with com-
plete observations in parenthesis. bData are based on the most recent available survey in each month. cNumber of
subjects (=respondents). dExcludes respondents who do not initiate benets before age 65. eNumber of subject-
months.
41Table 4: Piece-Wise Linear Labor Market (Re-)Exit Model
Gompertz Model
Exit Hazard Re-Exit Hazard
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(0.168) (0.170) (0.428) (0.445)














Male -0.071 -0.071 0.022 0.034
(0.106) (0.108) (0.221) (0.226)
White -0.061 -0.087 -0.275 -0.286
(0.105) (0.105) (0.206) (0.209)
BA -0.104 -0.107 0.097 0.096
(0.125) (0.125) (0.237) (0.242)
Prof. Degree -0.059 -0.050 -0.405 -0.424
(0.189) (0.190) (0.473) (0.479)
Married -0.029 -0.031 0.089 0.085












(0.100) (0.102) (0.221) (0.223)
Cognitive Test -0.015 -0.021 0.009 0.013
(0.016) (0.017) (0.034) (0.035)
Pr. Living to 85 -0.559 -0.437 0.439 0.410
(0.355) (0.353) (0.765) (0.774)
No Insurance -0.048 -0.066 -0.122 -0.129
(0.277) (0.277) (0.331) (0.333)
Private Insurance 0.099 0.118 -0.065 -0.069








(0.016) (0.016) (0.041) (0.042)
PIA 0.099 0.087 -0.301 -0.299
(0.167) (0.168) (0.303) (0.305)
Private Pension 0.001 0.001 0.162 0.157


















(0.070) (0.070) (0.125) (0.125)
Dur6-12 0.055
/ 0.044 -0.046 -0.044







































(0.480) (0.477) (0.936) (0.941)
Log Likelihood -2,612.242 -2,573.729 -639.271 -638.852
Sample Size 24,097 24,097 3,106 3,106
Notes: The dependent variable in the 'Exit' hazard model is the time-to-exit after age 62. The dependent variable in the 'Re-Exit' hazard
model is time-to-exit after reentering the labor force after age 62. The estimates indicate the direction and magnitude of a proportional shift of
the hazard, i.e. a positive sign indicates that exit is more likely (= time-to-exit from labor force is shorter). All models also control for regional
dummies and year dummies for the 62nd birthday. The models also include controls for missing observations on marital status, health, primary
respondent, cognitive score, probability of living to 85, health insurance, net wealth, PIA, and private pension. Robust standard errors are presented
in parenthesis. Data are based on the most recent available survey in each month.
42Table 5: Simultaneous Model of Labor Force Exit and Benet Claiming
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Name Exit Hazard Claiming Hazard Exit Hazard Claiming Hazard
Month Claimed 0.262 0.246
(0.231) (0.269)



















































(0.132) (0.164) (0.139) (0.157)
White -0.110 0.134 -0.118 0.109
(0.151) (0.201) (0.139) (0.175)
BA -0.193 -0.260 -0.201 -0.270
(0.161) (0.205) (0.162) (0.181)
Prof. Degree -0.020 0.061 -0.051 0.031
(0.245) (0.334) (0.245) (0.273)
Married 0.016 0.304 0.021 0.326
/












(0.140) (0.177) (0.128) (0.156)
Cognitive Test -0.028 -0.049
/ -0.024 -0.043
(0.023) (0.027) (0.022) (0.026)
Pr. Living to 85 -0.642 0.007 -0.758
/ -0.108
(0.476) (0.385) (0.434) (0.361)











(0.184) (0.224) (0.170) (0.205)
No Insurance -0.025 0.440 -0.053 0.441
(0.319) (0.410) (0.360) (0.376)
Private Insurance 0.122 0.324 0.113 0.308






















(0.014) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017)
PIA 0.186 0.258 0.259 0.338
(0.205) (0.293) (0.216) (0.262)
Private Pension 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004)































































































































Log Likelihood -4,151.437 -4,131.405
Notes: The dependent variable in the 'Exit Hazard' equation is the time-to-exit after age 62. The dependent variable in the 'Claiming Hazard'
equation is time-to-claiming Social Security Benets after age 62. The estimates indicate the direction and magnitude of a proportional shift of the
hazard, i.e. a positive sign indicates that exit or claiming are more likely. Model 2 includes a measure of the months spent working in the year before
turning 62. All models also include controls for missing observations on marital status, health, primary respondent, cognitive score, probability of
living to 85, health insurance, net wealth, PIA, and private pension. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The variances of the error
terms are set to 1 (i.e. seE
1 seC
1 1) as explained in the text. Data are based on the most recent available survey in each month. Sample size is
24,097 person-months in both models.
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